The vCenter Server must have new Key Encryption Keys (KEKs) reissued at regular intervals for vSAN encrypted datastore(s).

The KEK for a vSAN encrypted datastore is generated by the Key Management Server (KMS) and serves as a wrapper and lock around the Disk Encryption Key (DEK). The DEK is generated by the host and is used to encrypt and decrypt the datastore. A shallow rekey is a procedure in which the KMS issues a new KEK to the ESXi host, which rewraps the DEK but does not change the DEK or any data on disk.

This operation must be done on a regular, site-defined interval and can be viewed as similar in criticality to changing an administrative password. If the KMS is compromised, a standing operational procedure to rekey will put a time limit on the usefulness of any stolen KMS data.

If vSAN is not in use, this is not applicable.

Interview the system administrator (SA) to determine that a procedure has been put in place to perform a shallow rekey of all vSAN encrypted datastores at regular, site-defined intervals.

VMware recommends a 60-day rekey task, but this interval must be defined by the SA and the information system security officer (ISSO).

If vSAN encryption is not in use, this is not a finding.

If vSAN encryption is in use and a regular rekey procedure is not in place, this is a finding.

If vSAN encryption is in use, ensure a regular rekey procedure is in place.